Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry by Koch, Charles H., Jr.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 3 Article 1
2000
Control and Governance of Transmission
Organizations in the Restructured Electricity
Industry
Charles H. Koch Jr.
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles H. Koch Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
569 (2000) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol27/iss3/1
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
CONTROL AND GOVERNANCE OF TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS 
IN THE RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPRING 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 3
 
Recommended citation: Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission 
Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569 (2000).  
 CONTROL AND GOVERNANCE OF TRANSMISSION 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RESTRUCTURED 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.* 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  569 
 II. CONTEXT ...........................................................................................................  572 
A. Obstacles to a Market Approach for the Electric Utility Industry .............  572 
B. A More Realistic View of Electricity in a Market-Driven 
Electric Utility Industry .............................................................................  574 
C. Evolution of Regulatory Policy...................................................................  575 
1. Growing Skepticism about Regulation ................................................  575 
2. Federal Policy Development.................................................................  577 
3. State Developments ..............................................................................  578 
D. Focus on the Transmission Segment of the Industry .................................  579 
1. Emergence of the ISO Solution ............................................................  579 
2. FERC Explores Transmission Organization Options..........................  5782 
 III. REGIONAL APPROACH........................................................................................  584 
A. Reasons for a Regional Approach ..............................................................  585 
B. Authority for Mandating a Regional Approach .........................................  586 
 IV. CONTROL OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION..............................................  590 
A. Transco: The For-Profit Transmission Organization Model .....................  590 
1. The Transco Concept............................................................................  590 
2. Transco Will Continue Entrenched Market Power ..............................  592 
3. The Transco Model Will Preclude Independence from Regulation......  596 
B. ISO: Not-For-Profit Transmission Organizations .....................................  597 
 V. GOVERNANCE OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION.......................................  599 
A. Governance Mechanisms ............................................................................  599 
B. Regulatory Aspects of Transmission Organizations ..................................  602 
C. Process for Policy-Making in Transmission Organizations.......................  603 
 VI. INDIVIDUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION ...................................................................  606 
A. The Need for Individual Dispute Resolution .............................................  606 
B. FERC’s Contribution to Transmission Organization ADR........................  608 
1. FERC Must Assure Procedural Adequacy ...........................................  608 
2. FERC Should Promote a Specialized Presiding Official Pool.............  610 
C. Review of Law and Policy in an Electricity Dispute Resolution System....  611 
1. Administrative Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions..................  611 
2. Judicial Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions ............................  612 
 VII. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  613 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The electric utility industry, the largest industry in the United 
States,1 is in the process of a radical restructuring from a highly 
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regulated industry to one driven by a market regime. The impact of 
this restructuring will be profound and lasting on every aspect of our 
society. As the fourth largest state in the United States, the Florida 
Legislature’s approach to the deregulation of the electric utility in-
dustry and the emergence of the market regime will be of particular 
interest to the rest of the country. At present, particular attention is 
directed toward the transformation of control and governance of bulk 
transmission facilities, whose crucial role in transmitting electricity 
from generating plants to consumers represents the core of the elec-
tric utility industry. 
 Applying the market approach to the electric utility industry is 
plausible and has, to an extent, already proven workable.2 Neverthe-
less, certain technical characteristics unique to the industry chal-
lenge the conversion from a regulatory scheme to a purely market-
driven regime. This conversion has been the focus of an impressive 
amount of creative energy. In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) supplied the industry’s new foundation by 
promulgating two rules, Order 888 and 889,3 both of which sought to 
precipitate a shift to a market driven industry. Encouraged by these 
rules, the electric utility industry and various government institu-
tions have restructured the industry in many regions of the country.4 
 Industry participants must formulate a management scheme tai-
lored to the unique institutions that will serve as the cornerstone of 
the restructuring process. The emerging industry will have three 
separate segments: generation, marketing and distribution, and 
transmission. While a market approach to the generation and distri-
bution segments appears feasible,5 applying the same market ap-
proach to the transmission segment is problematic because electricity 
is an undifferentiated product that cannot be efficiently stored and 
cannot be directed from a source of production to any specific end-
user. Thus, the overarching task is to structure the transmission 
segment of the electric utility industry in a way that does not endan-
                                                                                                                      
 1. See TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING 
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 5 (1996) (stating that electricity had retail sales of over 
$200 billion in 1994). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) [hereinafter Order 888] (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385); Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-
Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) [here-
inafter Order 889] (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). The Florida Public Service Commission 
was an active participant in these rulemaking proceedings. See Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
21,698. 
 4. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
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ger the market solutions at work in the generation and distribution 
segments. 
 The current design of the transmission segment is not directed by 
legislation but by the FERC, through its delegated rulemaking au-
thority.6 On May 13, 1999, the FERC issued a rulemaking notice to 
accumulate information and comments on what should be the struc-
ture of regional transmission organizations.7 The rulemaking notice 
attempted to guide both the design of the transmission segment and 
its governing institutions. A number of designs have been proposed, 
and several systems have been implemented.8 However, many states, 
including Florida, are still in various stages of restructuring.9 
 This Article examines an alternative design for the governance 
and decision-making processes of transmission organizations. Part II 
of this Article provides a context for the restructuring of the electric 
utility industry, including obstacles to a market approach, models for 
structuring the industry, the evolution of regulatory policy, and a 
discussion of the transmission segment of the industry. Part III pro-
vides reasoning and authority for a regional approach to restructur-
ing the transmission segment of the industry. Part IV discusses the 
control of transmission organizations and examines the For-Profit 
Model and the Not-For-Profit Model. Part V examines the govern-
ance of electricity transmission organizations including governance 
mechanisms, the regulatory aspects, and the policy-making process. 
Part VI provides an examination of the need for individual dispute 
resolution in electricity transmission organizations, a discussion of 
the FERC’s contribution to ADR in transmission organizations, and a 
review of law and policy in an electricity dispute resolution system. 
The conclusion provides that the design of electricity transmission 
organizations is the keystone of the electric utility industry’s restruc-
turing and that the FERC should mandate a regional approach to 
this design. 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Two key electricity-restructuring bills, however, are before Congress, each of 
which includes provisions regarding transmission organizations. See Electric Consumers’ 
Power to Choose Act of 1999, H.R. 2050, 106th Cong. (1999); The Comprehensive Electric-
ity Competition Act, H.R. 1828, 106th Cong. (1999); The Comprehensive Electricity Com-
petition Act, S. 1047, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 7. See Regional Transmission Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 
Fed. Reg. 31,390, 87 FERC ¶ 61,173, at 61,684 (1999) [hereinafter RTO NOPR] (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35). One of the regional sessions conducted to formulate this proposed rule 
was held in Orlando, and the Florida Public Service Commission along with several Flor-
ida utilities participated. See id. at 31,442. 
 8. See id. at 31,410-11 n.159. 
 9. See infra Part II.C.3. 
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II.   CONTEXT 
A.   Obstacles to a Market Approach for the Electric Utility Industry 
 Three discrete bodies of law shape the electric utility industry: 
physics,10 economics, and society. The laws of physics that govern 
electricity are inflexible, leaving economics and society to adapt. 
Therein lies the complexity of restructuring the electric utility indus-
try. 
 Three characteristics of electricity mold the design of the electric 
utility industry. First, the product is totally undifferentiated. Second, 
the product cannot be economically stored,11 and hence “electricity is 
the ultimate perishable commodity.”12 Third, electricity cannot be di-
rected from a source of production to any specific end-user but, in-
stead, must flow towards that user. 
 The combination of these three characteristics of electricity frus-
trates implementation of a market approach to the electric utility in-
dustry. The complications arising from this combination are aptly il-
lustrated through the following metaphor: envision a person in Spain 
buying a cup of water from someone in the United States. The seller 
in the United States must deliver the water by dropping it into the 
Atlantic Ocean. To receive the delivery, the purchaser in Spain then 
dips into the Atlantic Ocean to withdraw the cup of water. The seller 
delivered a cup of water into the system and the purchaser withdrew 
a cup of water, but in no sense can either party identify the particu-
lar molecules of water that were the subject of their market transac-
tion. The transportation of the seller’s cup never literally occurs, and 
the cup withdrawn actually comes from an unidentifiable source, 
which in all probability is not the seller. 
 Similarly, a generator plant adds unidentifiable units of electricity 
to the flow from which a consumer extracts electricity for personal 
use. The generator plant’s agreement to supply the consumer with 
electricity can be honored only in the most artificial sense. Adding to 
this artificiality is the fiction that a particular unit of electricity is 
transported and transmitted directly to the user. In actuality, the 
consumed unit may have traveled any number of routes from any 
number of sources to the consumer. 
 The above conceptual problems did not exist in a pre-regulation, 
monopolistic electric utility industry in which a vertically-integrated 
utility generates, transports, and markets electricity. The consumer 
simply contracts with the utility, and the rest of the operation is co-
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antitrust Policy in the New Electricity Industry, 17 
ENERGY L.J. 29, 44 (1996). 
 11. See id.  
 12. Id. 
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ordinated by the utility. But a vertically-integrated electric utility 
industry presents serious economic problems. For instance, the util-
ity may, and should if acting responsibly for its owners, behave as a 
monopoly that limits the supply of electricity to maintain higher 
prices. Thus, a monopolistic, vertically-integrated system produces 
less electricity at a higher price than would a free market system, re-
sulting in a social welfare loss. The solution to the monopoly problem 
was regulation: allow the electric utility to coordinate the generation, 
transmission, and marketing of electricity while remaining under the 
command of a regulated and socially optimum management. 
 The laws of physics that dictate the method of electricity trans-
mission confound replacing the regulatory structure with a free mar-
ket structure.13 The question remains: How can a market in electric-
ity work when industry participants have so little control over the 
delivery of their product? To date, the fiction of a “contract path” has 
been used to solve the dilemma.14 In the contract path fiction, a par-
ticular generator agrees to sell a quantity of electricity to its consum-
ers. The consumers are under the impression that they are receiving 
units of electricity directly from the generator. Therefore, the fiction 
allows market-like transactions to take place. In reality, the electric-
ity of a particular generator plant is combined with the flow of elec-
tricity produced by numerous generator plants, and the consumer ex-
tracts electricity from this flow of undifferentiated units. 
 Not only do consumers never actually receive the contracted-for 
units from the specific generator, but, of course, the transportation of 
those contracted-for units never actually takes place. The generator 
produces electricity that is added to a flow of undifferentiated units 
of electricity and the end-user draws from that flow. The costs of the 
transmission facilities and services must be included in the agree-
ment and borne by the parties. Transmission charges may be set 
through a second fiction in which the contracted-for units are seen as 
actually traveling over the wires from the generator to the end-user. 
 In addition to the laws of physics obstacle, an economic obstacle 
exists that further hampers the adoption of a market regime. For 
decades, the assumption was made that the electric utility industry 
as a whole was a natural monopoly and that large firms were the 
most efficient form of organization, with regulation only attempting 
to temper economic abuse of their dominant positions.15 The unas-
                                                                                                                      
 13. See id. 
 14. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,424. 
 15. “In a world in which competition is ideal, . . . there is a natural monopoly in a par-
ticular market if and only if a single firm can produce the desired output at lower cost than 
any combination of two or more firms.” WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 54 (1982). A “natural monopoly” exists where a firm’s average costs continue to 
fall within any feasible range of production and hence one producer can satisfy total de-
mand requirements at the lowest cost. JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE 
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sailable conclusion remains that, while operation and distribution 
are not inherently monoplies, bulk transmission operates most effi-
ciently, indeed inevitably, as a monopoly. This transmission monop-
oly between the two competitive segments threatens the market ap-
proach. In sum, the restructuring of the electric utility industry from 
a regulated monopoly to a free market system will require an organ-
izational breakthrough in the design of transmission organizations 
that thwarts the tendency toward monopoly. 
B.   A More Realistic View of Electricity in a Market-Driven Electric 
Utility Industry 
 Redesigning transmission organizations must begin with accept-
ing the limitations inherent in electricity due to the laws of physics 
and economics. First, the fiction of bundles of contracted-for electric-
ity leaving the generator plant for transport to the consumers must 
be banished. Second, a new conceptualization of electricity must be 
adopted in which a generator plant sells its electricity into the flow, 
and the consumers purchase electricity from this flow. The new de-
sign of transmission organizations must simply ensure that electric-
ity flows from the generator plants to the consumers. 
 The laws of physics are inherent in the existing structure of 
transmission organizations. Every transmission organization has a 
system operator, an entity that makes decisions concerning the flow 
of electricity, or dispatch, which directs the flow of electricity. The 
system operator is a technical operation within the structure of the 
utility. Thus, system operators exist as the natural control centers 
for electricity transmission. Restructuring transmission systems en-
tails redesigning the existing structure so that transmission may be-
come part of a market-driven electric utility industry. 
 In economic terms, a market-driven electric utility industry faces 
two pricing problems: (1) coordinating the supply and demand for 
electricity, and (2) setting a price for transmission so that resulting 
loads, the electricity being transmitted, equals capacity, the amount 
of electricity that can flow through the bulk transmission wires. Any 
form of restructuring must produce a market-clearing price for elec-
tricity whereby the supply matches the demand at a level that can be 
accommodated by the transmission organization. Since electricity en-
                                                                                                                      
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 241-42 (6th ed. 1998). Observations regarding “subadditivity” 
suggest that the discovery of the social advantage from monopoly and perhaps regulation 
is more complicated than just declining costs. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE 
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE vi (1982) (“One of the fundamental 
insights on which this book is based is the finding that it is subadditivity of costs, and not 
scale economies, that determines when society can be served more economically by a mo-
nopoly firm.”). Beyond cautioning that one firm might produce at lower cost not linked to 
scale economies, applying subadditivity is a daunting empirical enterprise. See id. at 170-
72. 
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ters and exits these transmission organizations, the managers of 
those facilities will be key players in instituting market reforms. The 
efficient solution to the second problem places the transmission or-
ganizations in a bottleneck position. Without a pricing system that 
constrains the monopolistic tendencies of the transmission organiza-
tions, market-driven changes in the organizations will not be suc-
cessful. 
C.   Evolution of Regulatory Policy 
 The regulation of the electric utility industry was due in part to 
the acceptance that the industry is a “natural monopoly.”16 Regula-
tion of the industry was intended to capture the economic benefits 
from the economies of scale inherent in large, integrated electric 
utilities, but compelling the utilities to perform as if ruled by market 
forces. Recently, deep-seated economic and social forces have moved 
the focus from regulatory policy to market-driven approaches.17 
1.   Growing Skepticism about Regulation 
 The governmental regulation of the electric utility industry, while 
not without criticism,18 appeared unassailable until the late 1960s. 
Theoretical challenges to governmental regulation could not compete 
with the fact that the real price of electricity declined steadily over 
the same period.19 However, the decline in prices was primarily due 
to technological advances rather than to the efficiency of regulation.20 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See generally RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCOTT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE 
HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER ELECTRICITY (1986) (tracing the history of how the conflict be-
tween public and private interests has shaped the electric utility industry). 
 17. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regu-
lated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1383 (1998): 
We will consider four economic and social explanations for recent regulatory 
changes, arranged in order of increasing generality: (1) that the great trans-
formation has been caused by technological changes; (2) that it has been caused 
by a series of chain reactions brought about by the introduction of competition 
in one industry which has destabilized the status quo in another industry; (3) 
that it is the product of interest group politics; and (4) that it reflects an ideo-
logical consensus among policy elites that the risks of regulatory failure associ-
ated with the original paradigm are greater than the risks of market failure as-
sociated with competition. 
 18. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. 
 19. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and 
Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 
1344 (1993) (citing Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural 
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974)). 
 20. “On the contrary, retrospective studies have produced considerable evidence that 
cost-of-service regulation failed at its basic task of limiting utilities to a normal return on 
invested capital.” Id. (citing Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Struc-
tural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974)); 
see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 
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Still consumers were delighted to have cheap, readily available elec-
tricity. Governmental regulation of the industry, while viewed as a 
second-best solution, was considered far superior to a free-market 
system in which the utilities’ dominant position would prevent any 
form of regulation by market forces.21 
 In the 1970s, developments in engineering, economics, and law 
threatened the stability of the government’s electric utility regula-
tion. First, utilities began to exhaust economies of scale in the gen-
eration segment, and the generation segment no longer resembled a 
natural monopoly.22 At the same time, the transmission segment be-
came more efficient, and power could be transmitted as far as 1,000 
miles from the point of generation.23 Due to this increased transmis-
sion range, the electricity market became regional rather than local.24 
Second, electricity rates paid by consumers began to increase in real 
terms due to rising fuel and environmental cost.25 Third, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States,26 in which the Court recognized that at least some segments 
of the electric utility industry could be competitive with one another 
and, thus, subject to antitrust laws.27 The decision in Otter Tail, in 
concert with the publicity surrounding the decision in United States 
v. American Telephone & Telegraph,28 which opened telecommunica-
tions to competition, shook the legal foundations of the regulatory re-
gime.29 
 Key to the evolution of regulatory policy is the electric utility in-
dustry’s commitment to substantial growth. Two forces caused this 
commitment. First, traditional rate regulation led utilities to make 
excessive investments in increasing their “rate base.”30 A large rate 
base for a utility is advantageous because rates were computed to re-
cover regulatory costs and generate some profits, or “rate of return.”31 
Thus, utilities that could convince government regulators to permit 
an above-normal return on capital had a financial incentive to over-
                                                                                                                      
VA. L. REV. 1183, 1183-1208 (1986); George Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regula-
tors Regulate?: The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON 1 (1962). 
 21. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1970) (evincing an emerging skepticism that was to be instrumental in the 
deregulation movement). 
 22. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE 
COMPETITIVE ERA 14 (1997).  
 26. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 27. See id. at 374-75 (holding that antitrust laws can be applied to electric utilities). 
 28. 522 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 29. See id. (leading to the breakup of AT&T and opening telecommunications to 
competition). 
 30. Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1344-45. 
 31. Id. 
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invest in capital assets, which is termed the “Averch-Johnson ef-
fect.”32 Second, federal agency recommendations projected a signifi-
cant increase in the demand for electricity that led regulators to en-
courage utilities to engage in substantial expansion.33 Yet in the 
1980s, demand for electricity flattened, due to price increases and the 
popular call for conservation.34 Utility managers lost their financial 
glitter as government regulators restricted utilities’ attempts to re-
cover their investment in capital assets through higher rates to the 
consumers.35 Thus, the utilities began to seek relief from the govern-
mental regulatory regime, which restricted their profit margins. 
2.   Federal Policy Development 
 In 1935, the Federal Power Act was amended to give the recently 
created Federal Power Commission (FPC) authority over all whole-
sale distribution of electricity.36 When the Department of Energy was 
created in 1977, FPC was reconstituted as the FERC.37 The FERC, 
like the FPC, has the power to regulate rates charged by electric 
utilities and to supervise the general performance of the electric util-
ity industry. Regulatory authority over the electric utility industry is 
divided between the FERC and state regulatory authorities, which 
are known by a variety of names including public utility commissions 
(PUC) and public service commissions (PSC).38 Congress assigned the 
FERC authority over the wholesale, bulk segment of the industry, 
and states had authority over the industry’s non-interstate and retail 
segments.39 
 The FERC, with the support of Congress, began considering a 
comprehensive restructuring of the rules governing the electric util-
ity industry.40 On April 24, 1996, the FERC issued Orders 888 and 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
 33. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345-46. 
 34. See id. at 1346. 
 35. See id. 
 36. In 1920, Congress created the Federal Power Commission in the Federal Power 
Act, Part I and gave the Commission power over hydroelectric projects. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 
791-823 (1999). The Federal Power Act, Part II gave the FPC power over wholesale electric 
power. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (a)-(m) (1999). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(1)(B), 7293 (1994). 
 38. This article uses the term “PSC” to refer to state regulatory authorities in general 
because Florida has chosen that term. 
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1994). 
 40. The National Energy Act of 1978 produced a compendium of laws aimed at re-
structuring the entire United States energy industry, with several features directed spe-
cifically at electric utilities. More significant was the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (PURPA). PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.). PURPA encouraged, but did not require, rate reform 
and, most significantly, attempted to advantage certain types of independent generators, 
or “qualifying facilities.” See id. (Utilities were required to purchase their power at a price 
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889.41 Order 888 sought to precipitate a shift to a market-driven in-
dustry primarily by compelling open access to the transmission 
“grid,” the web of interconnected bulk power wires.42 Order 889 at-
tempted to establish transparent pricing of electricity by compelling 
electronic posting of prices and availability through creating a com-
puter network of electricity market information known as “Open Ac-
cess Same-Time Information System” (OASIS).43 While Order 889’s 
pricing transparency was necessary for the emergence of the com-
petitive electric utility industry, Order 888’s open access initiative 
supplied the general foundation upon which restructuring would be 
built.44 The strategy behind Order 888 was to describe goals and al-
low the utilities, with PSC coordination, to design a new market-
driven industry.45 
3.   State Developments 
 State electric utility deregulation has proceeded at an uneven 
pace, with high-cost electricity states, such as California, New 
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, moving quickly to deregulate, and 
low-cost states like Kansas, Nebraska, and Kentucky enacting few, if 
any, changes to their regulatory schemes.46 Despite the uneven pace, 
the trend in all states, as in the federal regulatory system, is toward 
less regulation and more competition in the electric utility industry.47 
Electric utility deregulation is a contentious political issue in most 
states.48 While most deregulation orders were issued through legisla-
                                                                                                                      
that did not exceed the “avoided costs,” the cost they would have incurred by building new 
plants.). The crucial legislative step was the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). EPAct, 
Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified, among other places, at 15 U.S.C. § 
79z-5a (1997), and 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(22-25), 824j (1985)). There, Congress required the 
FERC to force utilities to deliver power from generators to other utilities and electricity 
wholesalers at reasonable, nondiscriminatory, cost-based rates. See id. This legislative 
mandate led the FERC to issue its open access rule, Order 888. 
 41. See Order 888, supra note 3; Order 889, supra note 3. 
 42. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552. 
 43. Order 889, supra note 3, at 21,737. 
 44. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,541. 
 45. See id. at 21,542. 
 46. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Status of State Electricity Restruc-
turing Activity as of March 2000 (visited Apr. 1, 2000) 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/tab5rev.html>. 
 47. See id. 
 48. The greatest challenge to deregulation may be the issue of stranded costs. Deregu-
lation would make many utilities’ past investments economically unviable. The costs of 
these commitments, or “stranded cost,” could amount to between 10 and 200 billion dollars. 
See BRENNAN, supra note 1, at 96. Who will bear these costs is controversial. Order 888 
guarantees utilities may “recover their legitimate, prudent and verifiable stranded costs.” 
Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,628. Stranded cost recovery is standard in deregulation 
bills. Still, in both California and Massachusetts, ballot initiatives were proposed that 
would limit the recovery of stranded costs. See California Proposition 9 (1998); Massachu-
setts Question 4: Referendum on an Existing Law (1998) (last modified Jan. 29, 2000) 
<http://www.state.ma.us/sec/ele/elebq98/bq98qst4.htm> (limiting the recovery of stranded 
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tion, some state PSCs have been primarily responsible for state de-
regulation.49 In fact, some legislatures have passed bills instructing 
their PSCs to instigate the deregulation of the electric utility indus-
try.50 However, when PSCs have attempted to instigate deregulation 
without a delegation of authority from their legislatures, such as in 
New Mexico and Michigan,51 state supreme courts have struck down 
PSC deregulation orders.52 
 Electricity rates vary substantially throughout the country, which 
leads to different concerns regarding deregulation in different re-
gions. States with higher-than average rates are most anxious to ex-
periment with deregulation while ratepayers in low-rate states worry 
that regionalization will lead their utilities to seek more profitable 
markets and subsequently increase their rates.53 Florida was among 
those states that advised the FERC that the above concerns should 
not be allowed to impede state deregulation.54 
D.   Focus on the Transmission Segment of the Industry 
 At present, reforms of the regulatory policy for the electric utility 
industry are comprehensive and attempt to restructure the industry 
as a holistic unit. The several schemes now in place are building a 
useful foundation for creating a wholly market-driven industry.55 
However, as discussed above, the transmission segment of the indus-
try resists market alternatives for reasons based in both the physical 
characteristics of electricity as a product and the economic realities 
of transmitting electric current through bulk transmission systems.56 
Thus, special attention must be placed on the transmission segment 
for the entire industry to emerge as market-driven. 
1.   Emergence of the ISO Solution 
 The dominant approach to restructuring the transmission seg-
ment of the electric utility industry revolves around the development 
of independent transmission system operators (ISOs). Many experts 
urge that the best method for ensuring nondiscriminatory transmis-
sion of electricity is to place management, if not ownership and op-
                                                                                                                      
costs would have required a no vote to the ballot question, which asked whether voters ap-
proved of the state’s electric utility restructuring act passed the previous year). 
 49. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 46. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Sandel v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm’n, 980 P.2d 55, 64 (N.M. 1999). 
 53. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 46. 
 54. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,412. 
 55. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Evolving Regulatory Reform: The 
Federal and State Role in Promoting Competition (visited Apr. 1, 2000) 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/chapter7.html>. 
 56. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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eration, in the hands of an independent entity.57 If the management 
function can be segregated from the business of transmission, the in-
dependent management could operate the grid to facilitate the emer-
gence of a market-driven regime without the contamination inherent 
in being a market participant.58 
 An ISO has two complementary roles: (1) “daily operation” of a 
specified transmission grid, the scope of which can be controversial, 
and (2) implementation of a “bidding system that would determine 
which generators provide power to the grid” at any given price and 
“point in time.”59 The ISO would “use existing algorithms that reflect 
the characteristics of the grid, including the capacity constraints and 
network interactions that exist in varying generation and load condi-
tions.”60 These capacity or congestion constraints define the value of 
the transmission operation, and the ISO would optimize transmis-
sion capacity so that the least costly electricity flows to the consum-
ers who value it the most.61 
 The ISO, alone or coordinated with another entity, would engage 
in this complicated operation in addition to the technical operation of 
managing the flow of electricity. The ISO would either run or be af-
filiated with a “power exchange.”62 For each half hour, “each pur-
chaser would submit a bid that consists of the quantity of electricity” 
the purchaser desires at any particular price, and each generator 
plant “would submit a bid that consists of the quantity of electricity” 
that the plant “is willing to sell” at any given price; thus, the prices 
for each bid may vary for different delivery points and extraction 
points, often referred to as “nodes.”63 The ISO “would then input the 
bids and run the algorithm.”64 The output from the algorithm would 
include (1) “the quantity of electricity that flows in and out of the 
grid at each node during that half hour;” (2) “the price paid and re-
ceived at each node;” and (3) “the per unit cost of transmission on 
each path.”65 The ISO “would automatically implement an efficient 
transmission pricing policy” because the “marginal cost of transmis-
sion from one node to any other node would be the difference between 
the time-specific prices of electricity at the two nodes.”66 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,595-97. 
 58. See id. at 21,596. 
 59. Pierce, supra note 10, at 40 (discussing the “Poolco” model). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Andrew Noceto et al., Public Utilities Commission, 16 CA. REG. L. REP. 158, 159 
(1999) (specifically examining the experiences of the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion). 
 63. Pierce, supra note 10, at 40. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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 Both state and regional restructuring of the electric utility indus-
try have incorporated versions of the ISO.67 While these restructur-
ing efforts that employ ISOs incorporate practical design elements, 
they are based on theoretical models.68 Many states have chosen to 
install various forms of transmission organizations that include 
ISOs, Power Exchanges (PXs), or organizations that combine func-
tions of both.69 The Desert Southwest Transmission and Reliability 
Operator (Desert STAR) presents an interesting new design that re-
quires further examination. The Desert STAR is an Independent 
Scheduling Administrator (ISA), also known as an “ISO lite.”70 Ohio 
is one of a few states with two competing ISOs, the Alliance71 and the 
Midwest ISO.72 
 Given the variety of options, the kind of transmission organiza-
tions states will implement is unclear. Moreover, how many states 
will have transmission organizations designated by state, such as 
California, remains unclear.73 Most ISOs seem to be regional, such as 
the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection, Alliance 
ISO, and Midwest ISO.74 The trend is toward regional transmission 
organizations, and the FERC is promoting that option.75 Still, the 
Florida’s PSC has urged the FERC not to impose a one-size-fits-all 
approach to transmission organization design.76 The FERC appears 
inclined to follow the Florida PSC’s advice, and Florida will soon 
need to give its attention to developing its own transmission organi-
zation design. 
 A number of countries adopted some form of the ISO when they 
restructured their electric utility industries, including Great Britain, 
                                                                                                                      
 67. For a valuable and comprehensive exploration of the governance of four power 
pools outside the United States, see James Barker et al., Regulation of Power Pools and 
System Operators: An International Comparison, 18 ENERGY L.J. 261 (1997). 
 68. See J.P. Pfeifenberger et al., In What Shape is Your ISO?, ELECTRICITY J., July 
1998, at 80-81. 
 69. See Robert J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 ENERGY 
L.J. 233, 246-249 (1999). 
 70. K.R. Saline & Associates, Desert STAR Update (May-June 1998) (visited June 21, 
1999) <http://www.swrta.org/desert.html>. The Desert STAR appears to represent Arizona, 
New Mexico, Texas, and Las Vegas. See id. 
 71. The Alliance ISO includes American Electric Power, Consumers Energy, Detroit 
Edison, First Energy Corp., and the Virginia Electric and Power Company, and First En-
ergy Corp. (Ohio). See generally U.S. Energy Information Administration, Summary In-
formation on Approved and Planned Independent System Operators as of March 31, 1998 
(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_issu/chg_iss_rpt/ 
table15.html> (table presenting information on approved and planned ISOs). 
 72. The Midwest ISO includes Ohio companies Cinergy, Commonwealth Edison, Illi-
nois Power, CILCO, and Louisville Gas and Electric. Midwest ISO serves Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 76. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,411. 
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Norway, New Zealand, Argentina, and Chile.77 Most relevant to the 
United States is the design of Canadian systems.78 Ontario, which is 
connected with Michigan, New York, and Minnesota, designed its 
transmission system around an independent “grid company.”79 Al-
berta, which is connected with the Northwest, has already restruc-
tured its electricity market by creating a grid company, “Alberta 
Gridco,” that administers a single transmission facility.80 Under the 
Alberta Gridco structure, transmission-owning utilities have no con-
trol over the rates and conditions that are governed by the provincial 
utility board.81 
2. FERC Explores Transmission Organization Options 
 
 The ISO serves as the fulcrum upon which a market regime can 
be established for the electric utility industry. Order 888 did not fo-
cus on the special problems of restructuring the transmission seg-
ment of the industry, but Order 888 does encourage ISOs.82 While not 
mandating the use of ISOs, Order 888 suggests that a restructuring 
proposal be facilitated through the FERC’s regulatory machinery if 
authority over transmission was delegated to some form of ISO.83 
While Order 888 did not prescribe a particular form for the manage-
ment function of electric utilities, it did provide eleven principles that 
provide guidance.84 
                                                                                                                      
 77. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 40. 
 78. The FERC’s open access regulation has been resisted by some Canadian utilities. 
See Mary K. Strahan, Comment: Connecting Currents: Toward the Integration of North 
American Electricity Markets, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 291, 311 (1999). 
 79. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION IN ONTARIO’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM, A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION: THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
COMPETITION IN ONTARIO’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM TO THE ONTARIO MINISTER OF 
ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY 53 (1996). 
 80. TransAlta Enterprises Corp., 75 FERC ¶ 61,268, at 61,875 (1996). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,565. 
 83. See id. at 21,595. 
 84. See id. at 21,595-97. Briefly those principles are:  
 1. Fair and non-discriminatory governance 
 2. no conflicts of interest 
 3.  “[a] single, unbundled, grid-wide tariff [rates and other conditions] 
that applies to all eligible users in a non-discriminatory manner;" 
 4. responsibility for assuring reliability 
 5. control over interconnection 
 6. promote efficient trading of electricity 
 7. establish incentives for efficient management 
 8. non-discriminatory provision of ancillary services 
 9. assure that information is publicly available 
 10. coordinate among grids; and 
 11. establish alternative dispute resolution processes. 
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 The FERC recognized the need to move transmission development 
from the “traditional means of grid management” to a second stage in 
which information about ISOs’ actual operation will emerge and cer-
tain crucial issues, previously bypassed, will be confronted.85 To 
achieve this goal, the FERC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NOPR) regarding transmission organizations.86 The NOPR stated: 
Our objective is for all transmission owning entities in the Nation, 
including non-public utility  entities, to place their transmission 
facilities under the control of appropriate regional transmission in-
stitutions in a timely manner. We seek to accomplish our objective 
by encouraging voluntary participation. We are therefore propos-
ing in this rulemaking minimum characteristics and functions for 
appropriate regional transmission institutions; a collaborative pro-
cess by which public utilities and non-public utilities that own, op-
erate or control interstate transmission facilities, in consultation 
with the state officials as appropriate, will consider and develop 
regional transmission institutions; a willingness to consider incen-
tive pricing on a case-specific basis and an offer of non-monetary 
regulatory benefits, such as deference in dispute resolution, re-
duced or eliminated codes of conduct, and streamlined filing and 
approval procedures; and a time line for public utilities to make 
appropriate filings with the Commission and initiate operation of 
regional transmission institutions. As a result, we expect jurisdic-
tional utilities to form Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs).87 
 These objectives raise a deceptively contentious list of issues, not 
the least of which is the encouragement of “Regional Transmission 
Organizations,”88 which implies that the transmission systems will 
operate on a regional basis rather than a state basis. The recommen-
dation of using Regional Transmission Organizations portends a 
power struggle between the FERC and state regulators that may also 
involve state legislatures. 
 Equally controversial is the NOPR’s apparent indifference to 
“transcos,” which are private systems operators and not-for-profit 
ISOs. Because systems managers will be able to capture or distribute 
substantial benefits from their dominant position, many academics 
and regulators fear delegating the power to control transmission or-
ganizations to a commercial entity and, hence, advocate the commer-
cial independence of not-for-profit ISOs.89 Others have faith that pri-
                                                                                                                      
 85. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391. 
 86. See id. at 31,390. 
 87. Id. at 31,391. 
 88. Id.  
 89. See William L. Massey, Policy on Regional Transmission Organizations: Five Pit-
falls FERC Must Avoid, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, at 18-19. 
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vate ownership will offer the most efficient and reliable transmission 
services.90 
 Although immediate attention will be given to the regional and 
commercial aspects of the transmission organization, the governance 
and process alternatives will also be crucial to the ultimate success of 
any redesign of the transmission organization. Such issues as stake-
holder governance, participation in policymaking, processes for set-
ting standards, and individual dispute resolution procedures must be 
resolved in any transmission organization design. 
III.   REGIONAL APPROACH 
 The FERC’s regional transmission organization NOPR, while con-
tinuing the theme of voluntary participation from Order 888, boldly 
states: “we expect jurisdictional utilities to form Regional Transmis-
sion Organizations (RTOs).” 91 The FERC’s expectation of regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) creates conflict between the tra-
ditional roles of the FERC and state regulators. The FERC’s current 
delegation of authority, as it has been historically interpreted, limits 
the FERC’s authority to the interstate and wholesale segments of the 
electric utility industry, while states traditionally have had authority 
over the retail delivery function of the industry.92 A shift to RTOs 
compromises both the FERC’s and the state regulator’s traditional 
realms of authority. 
 The transmission system was partitioned along state lines to take 
advantage of state regulation.93 Today, technology permits high volt-
age current to be efficiently transmitted up to 1,000 miles from the 
point of generation, and the transmission lines are interconnected to 
form a national grid for electrical power.94 The interconnection of 
transmission lines was created so that various systems could support 
each other, but this goal has been hindered by the very limited capac-
ity of transmission lines.95 Despite the limited capacity of transmis-
sion lines, the electricity market has been regional not local.96 
 At present, both state and regional transmission organizations ex-
ist or are being developed. State-centered operating transmission or-
ganizations exist in California and Texas, and the FERC has condi-
                                                                                                                      
 90. See id. at 19. 
 91. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391. 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1994). 
 93. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE 
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 91 (Brookings Inst. ed. 1974); Public Util. Comm’n of Rhode 
Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electricity Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927) (electricity sold across 
state lines was held to be interstate commerce and under federal jurisdiction). 
 94. See Black & Pierce, supra note 19, at 1345. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
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tionally approved one in New York.97 Additionally, Arizona and Ne-
vada have begun the process for approval of state-centered transmis-
sion organizations.98 In contrast, several RTOs are in operation or in 
various stages of development.99 Therefore, the FERC should insti-
gate a debate over the optimum geographic configuration for trans-
mission organizations.100 The FERC’s tardiness in facilitating this 
debate will likely be blamed for the high cost incurred from the delay 
in implementing RTOs.101 
A.   Reasons for a Regional Approach 
 The FERC presumes that regional organizations are superior, and 
the FERC’s NOPR listed five major benefits of RTOs, each benefit 
with several substantial subpoints.102 These benefits of RTOs support 
three arguments: (1) regional organization offers the most efficient 
market; (2) regional organization enables self-regulation in which 
government regulators withdraw to a position of monitoring the pri-
vate regulation; and (3) regional organization enhances the growth 
and reliability of the electricity market.103 Reconfiguring the industry 
into a few large, RTOs will create an efficient market.104 As explained 
above, electricity does not actually flow from the generator plant to 
the purchaser of that generator plant’s production; rather the gen-
erator plants add their electricity into the flow, and the purchaser 
draws electricity from the flow.105 
 Resulting from the fiction of the contract flow, that the consumed 
electricity is the same as the electricity for which the consumer con-
tracts, any price for transmission is artificial. Due to the contract 
path, transmission charges have been based on the distance the elec-
tricity travels from the assigned source.106 A large RTO makes realis-
tic transmission charges possible, and the total charges can reflect 
operating costs, including salaries to employees and managers, in-
vestment returns, and incentives.107 The RTO facilitates uniform 
charges so all RTO customers cover their share of the costs of opera-
                                                                                                                      
 97. See Massey, supra note 89, at 15. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 71. 
 100. The Commission acknowledges that it has recognized the benefits of regional 
organization for some time. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407. 
 101. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Why FERC Must Mandate Efficiently Structured Re-
gional ISOs-Now!, ELECTRICITY J., Jan. 1999, at 54. 
 102. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407-11. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 51. 
 105. See supra Part II.A. 
 106. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50. 
 107. See id. at 50-52. See generally RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,407-11 (discussing 
the benefits of RTOs). 
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tion and transmission.108 The unified operation can figure the capac-
ity of the entire system and allocate capacity to avoid congestion.109 
This system encourages charges to represent actual costs, cuts 
transaction costs, and encourages necessary investment. A unified 
pricing system encourages competition by creating trust in the sys-
tem.110 In sum, the major market advantage of the RTO is that it cre-
ates uniform and tradable units of electricity.111 Natural forces, with-
out the artificiality of government ratemaking, will therefore set 
rates.112 
 A major obstacle to competition is entrenched opportunities for 
former utilities to maintain their dominance through a system of af-
filiates. Hence RTOs, especially if commercially independent as dis-
cussed below, must make objective decisions and, perhaps more im-
portantly, must be perceived by stakeholders as making objective de-
cisions.113 Due to this objective decision-making, many regulatory-
type decisions can be left in the RTOs’ hands. Administering a 
transmission system requires extremely high performance standards, 
and industry members are in a better position to set those standards 
than federal or state regulators.114 The RTO can make uniform stan-
dards for a large portion of the electric utility industry. The FERC 
anticipates that its direct regulatory duties will diminish with the 
development of RTOs. Similarly, the FERC perceives that a trusted 
RTO will provide individual dispute resolution services without in-
volving the federal government. 115 Thus, the FERC’s role will shift to 
monitoring the performance of the self-regulatory RTO much like the 
relationship among the SEC and the large securities exchanges. 
 The trust between RTOs and stakeholders will also enhance the 
growth and reliability of RTOs. Investors in RTOs will know that 
their investment will not be compromised by discriminatory self-
dealing by insiders.116 Reliability will also be increased by RTOs su-
periority in planning for future needs and meeting those needs due to 
the more comprehensive view the RTO is positioned to take.117  
B.   Authority for Mandating a Regional Approach 
 Nonetheless, the RTO presents a tremendous source of tension as 
evidenced in the FERC’s consultation with the states that unsurpris-
                                                                                                                      
 108. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50-52.  
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See infra Part III.B. 
 114. See Pierce, supra note 101, 49-50. 
 115. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,410. 
 116. See Massey, supra note 89, at 15. 
 117. See id. 
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ingly revealed substantial opposition to RTOs.118 The creation of 
RTOs intrudes upon traditional areas of state power and well-
entrenched state regulatory authorities. Moreover, opposition came 
from the existing electric utilities. They have traditionally exercised 
substantial influence over state regulators, and may not be able to 
wield the same influence over RTOs where the utilities’ interest will 
compete with those of consumers and independent generator plants, 
as well as with other RTO owners.119 
 The FERC, in the NOPR, sought cooperation from the states in 
shifting to a national system of a few RTOs.120 Indeed, the only way 
for a market-driven electric utility industry to be successful is for the 
FERC to design a system of RTOs. Therefore, the FERC should be 
assertive in exercising its authority to design such a system. The two 
recent major restructuring bills grant the FERC authority to create 
RTOs in recognition of the need for the FERC’s leadership on this is-
sue.121 
 Even without the recent bills, the FERC’s authority to design a 
system of RTOs under existing legislation is undisputed. The FERC 
timidly asserts its authority to mandate RTOs, citing particularly its 
authority under Section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA).122 
Section 202(a) of the FPA states that “the Commission is empowered 
and directed to divide the country into regional districts . . . .”123 A 
superficial ambiguity is created by the phrase “for the voluntary in-
terconnection and coordination of facilities.”124 However, the volun-
tariness refers to the coordination in the RTO and not to the power of 
the FERC to create such authorities.125 
 Key to deriving the FERC’s authority to design a system of RTOs 
from section 202(a) is the section’s explicit delegation of authority to 
make policy. The final command of section 202(a) delegates to the 
FERC the responsibility to make decisions regarding electric utility 
policy and to implement these decisions. Section 202(a) sets the goal 
of “assuring an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the 
United States with the greatest possible economy and with regard to 
the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources.”126 Sec-
                                                                                                                      
 118. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,411 (“Most states oppose a FERC mandate to 
form RTOs.”). 
 119. See id. at 31,390. 
 120. See id. at 31,391. 
 121. See H.R. 1828, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1047, 106th Cong. (1999); Electric Consum-
ers’ Power to Choose Act of 1999, H.R. 2050, 106th Cong. 
 122. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,391. 
 123. 16 U.S.C. § 824a. (a) (1994). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 55. 
 126. 16 U.S.C. § 824a. (a) (1994). 
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tion 202(a), thus, provides ample authority to support the conclusion 
that the nation’s transmission system must operate through RTOs.127 
 A long and well-established principle of administrative law ex-
tends great deference to an agency charged with policymaking re-
sponsibility.128 This long-standing principle was confirmed in the 
celebrated opinion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.129 When challenging an agency’s construction of a 
statutory provision involving its own duties, Justice Stevens con-
cluded the agency interpretation must prevail where the question 
“really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than 
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Con-
gress.”130 Such policymaking discretion has long been recognized un-
der the FPA.131 Applying the conclusions of Justice Stevens and the 
recognition of discretion from the FPA, the FERC’s implementation 
of a policy that favors RTOs would be within the FERC’s policymak-
ing responsibility and a reasonable exercise of the FERC’s authority. 
 However, a bold assertion of the FERC’s authority may be tem-
pered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent inclination to protect state 
sovereignty.132 The Court’s strongest protection of state sovereignty 
occurred in Printz v. United States133 in which county sheriffs sought 
to enjoin enforcement of the provision of the Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act that imposed enforcement responsibilities on 
the county sheriffs.134 The Court’s commitment to protecting state 
sovereignty is poignantly illustrated by the following statement: “It is 
the very principal of separate state sovereignty that such a law of-
                                                                                                                      
 127. Section 210, granting the FERC authority over interconnection, supplements its 
authority under section 202(a). Section 210 expands its authority to require new intercon-
nections, see 16 U.S.C. § 824i. (a)(1)(A), and authorizes “such action as may be necessary to 
make effective any physical connection . . . [that] is ineffective for any reason.” 16 U.S.C. § 
824i. (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  
 128. See generally 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 
12.31 (2d. ed. 1997) (discussing policymaking as the “zenith” of administrative authority). 
 129. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 130. Id. at 866. 
 131. Deference to the FERC’s policymaking discretion, from the FPC, was established 
in the classic statement of Judge Leventhal: “[W]e observe that the breadth of agency dis-
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ioning of policies . . . .” Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d 
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 132. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that states may not be 
sued in their own courts by state employees for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2202 (1999) (holding that states 
are immune from patent infringement suits); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 119 
S.Ct. 2219, 2220 (1999) (holding that states are immune from trademark suits). 
 133. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 134. See id. at 901. 
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fends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can 
overcome that fundamental defect.”135 
 Still, control over the transmission of electricity is not an inherent 
component of state sovereignty. The Court in Printz expressly distin-
guished a case, FERC v. Mississippi,136 involving a similar state sov-
ereignty challenge to the FERC’s exercising regulatory authority 
over the states.137 In FERC v. Mississippi, the Court “upheld the 
statutory provision at issue precisely because . . . [it] merely imposed 
preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-
empted field.”138 In reviewing the regulatory actions of the FERC’s 
predecessor, the FPC, the Court found, in the Permian Basin Area 
Rate Cases,139 that the FPC “must be free, within the limitations im-
posed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise 
methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and 
conflicting interests.”140 
 Traditionally, the electric utility industry and, specifically, the 
transmission segment of the industry have been considered inter-
state commerce, and as a consequence, the state’s regulatory author-
ity over the industry derives purely from congressional delegation.141 
If the FERC chooses to exercise its authority over wholesale trans-
mission in a manner that diminishes state regulatory authority, the 
states’ challenge to the FERC’s actions cannot be based on the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty.142 In fact, if the FERC finds with adequate 
support that RTOs are preferable to an individualized state system, a 
reviewing court would overstep its authority by second-guessing a 
policy choice that is within the FERC’s discretion and based on its 
expertise. 
                                                                                                                      
 135. Id. at 932. 
 136. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
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IV.   CONTROL OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION 
 All transmission organization proposals are based on the theme of 
independence that arises in three distinct ways. First, the whole de-
regulation and restructuring effort is motivated by the desire to be 
independent from state and federal government regulators.143 Sec-
ond, many transmission organization proposals offer designs that are 
independent from the pitfalls of commercial allures such as discrimi-
nation and self-dealing.144 In fact, the FERC’s list of minimum char-
acteristics provides that “The RTO Must be Independent of Market 
Participants.”145 Third, other proposals offer a transmission organiza-
tion that is independent from the other segments of the electric util-
ity industry.146 In deciding which transmission organization design is 
best, all three independence concerns must be evaluated. 
 As discussed above, the dominant vision for the design of the 
transmission organization revolves around an independent authority 
that is insulated from commercial forces.147 As more proposals are 
put forward, some designers are now suggesting that the transmis-
sion organization, as well as the generation and distribu-
tion/marketing segments, could be structured as a for-profit entity. 
Since the nomenclature for these models are still unsettled, “transco” 
will designate a for-profit transmission organization model, and ISO 
(independent system operator) will designate a not-for-profit model. 
Both models are explicated and evaluated below. 
A.   Transco: The For-Profit Transmission Organization Model 
 
1. The Transco Concept 
 
 Prior to restructuring, transmission grids were owned and man-
aged by private utilities, referred to as investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs), that provided the transmission facilities and the ancillary 
services necessary to transmit electricity.148 IOUs are vertically-
                                                                                                                      
 143. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Factors Underlying the Restructur-
ing of the Electric Power Industry (visited Apr. 1, 2000) 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/chapter5.html>. 
 144. See Massey, supra note 89, at 15. 
 145. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414. 
 146. See Massey, supra note 89, at 14. 
 147. See RTO NOPR, supra note 6, at 31,414. 
 148. Ancillary services or interconnection operation services are necessary to support 
the transmission operation. The FERC proposed six ancillary services: “(1) scheduling and 
dispatching services, (2) load following service, (3) energy imbalance service, (4) system 
protection service, (5) reactive power/voltage control service, and (6) loss compensation ser-
vice.” Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,579. One commentator observed: “Discussions of spe-
cific ISOs can be confusing at this stage because the range of services that grid operators 
provide or manage can be disaggregated or decomposed in different ways, depending in 
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integrated business entities that owned not only the transmission 
segments of the electric utility industry, but also the generation and 
marketing/distribution segments.149 IOUs provided capital, made de-
cisions about investment, and took risks for future development, and 
thereby assured the reliability of the system.150 IOUs generally did a 
complicated job well. 
 Restructuring of the industry requires a fundamental decision: 
should the vertically-integrated IOUs divest themselves of the gen-
eration and marketing/distribution segments. The FERC, in Order 
888, concluded that “functional unbundling” would be sufficient.151 
Functional unbundling requires that the utilities separate the differ-
ent segments of their operation, make interaction among the seg-
ments open to the public, and open transmission access to competi-
tors of the utilities’ former affiliates.152 
 The transco structure would transfer the transmission operation 
over to a for-profit firm that would both own and operate the trans-
mission organization.153 The transco structure would differ from the 
ISO in that the for-profit firm would own, operate, and manage the 
transmission facilities.154 Whereas an ISO would independently 
manage the transmission wires without interference from commer-
cial interests, the transco would manage and operate transmission 
wires for profit while remaining structurally independent from the 
generator plants and marketers/distributors.155 The transco conforms 
to functional unbundling but allows the utilities to continue to own 
the wires and compete in other segments of the industry through af-
filiates.156  
 Transco proponents urge that the profit motive will lead to an effi-
cient management of the transmission wires.157 Further, transco pro-
ponents doubt that not-for-profit ISO managers will operate under 
                                                                                                                      
part on the overall structure of the [future transmission organization].” FOX-PENNER, su-
pra note 25, at 202. 
 149. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Generation Compo-
nents (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
chg_str/chapter3.html>. 
 150. Indeed, this Author has observed that the electric utility industry consistently re-
ceives high marks from consumers. 
 151. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552 (“In the absence of evidence that functional un-
bundling will not work, we are not prepared to adopt a more costly mechanism—corporate 
unbundling [i.e. divestiture]—at this time.”). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Commissioner Herbert is the leading proponent inside the Commission. See Curt 
L. Herbert, Jr., Moving the RTO Debate, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, 20. 
 154. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,396 (“[T]he preference of certain transmission 
owners to sell or transfer their transmission assets to a for-profit transmission company in 
lieu of handing over control to a non-profit ISO” has made it difficult to form voluntary, 
multi-state ISOs.). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22. 
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an incentive system that will result in an efficient and reliable deliv-
ery of transmission services.158 The for-profit transco, which is subject 
to market forces, is expected by proponents to provide optimum 
transmission services, in the same manner as the other for-profit 
segments of the restructured industry are expected to optimize their 
functions.159 
2.   Transco Will Continue Entrenched Market Power 
 Transmission organizations will be regional monopolies, and op-
ponents of the transco model fear a single for-profit entity having 
control over the transmission segment absent any natural forces to 
prevent an abuse of this dominant position.160 This concern is exacer-
bated by the incomplete separation between transcos and affiliates 
that permits the owners of transmission wires to unfairly advantage 
their partners in other segments of the electric utility industry.161 
 Recent economic theory provides that even the power of a monop-
oly can be constrained if the monopoly’s market is “contestable.”162 
Contestable markets are those dominated by a single firm, but where 
“different firms may compete to be the single supplier.”163 Contesta-
bility, however, cannot bring market forces to bear on a monopoly in 
the absence of potential entry by competitors.164 Entry by competitors 
into a regional transmission area will be virtually impossible because 
transcos “may draw narrow boundaries” that “achieve control over 
key gateways of transmission commerce;” thus, the general condi-
tions for contestability are not present.165 Transcos, as a result, will 
be able to exercise their dominance in the market without any re-
straints. The very nature of the industry’s transmission segment and 
the continuing commitment to and need for regulation under the 
transco model leads to the conclusion that contestability will not 
eliminate or even modify the exercise of monopoly power by transco 
entities.166 
                                                                                                                      
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 161. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50. 
 162. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 6-7 (Rev. ed. 1988). 
 163. HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 242. 
 164. “[W]e have presented several examples in which some or all of the feasible price 
vectors available to the monopolist are unsustainable in the absence of entry barriers. 
However, we have also shown that while the pressure of potential entry can, in some cir-
cumstances, lead to instability in the market place, it is also a potent force extending the 
benefits of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ to monopoly markets.” Id. at 217. 
 165. Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 166. See generally HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 242. In the context 
of the transmission industry, the competition stage will have been completed, leaving the 
transcos in the dominant position. 
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 The “weak invisible hand” of contestability may operate to con-
strain the exercise of monopolistic power when entry is possible, but 
competition in the transmission segment through duplicate trans-
mission wires is highly implausible.167 Still, competition among dif-
ferent grids might occur if transco entities take extreme advantage of 
their market positions.168 As the FERC observed: “Many power sales 
and transmission service contracts are written under the assumption 
that the power delivered will flow on a particular contract path . . . 
However, this assumption often does not accurately reflect what ac-
tually occurs . . . [as] some power may flow over the lines of adjoining 
transmission systems.”169 The presence of parallel paths suggests 
that alternative paths might actually exist. Nevertheless, the num-
ber of these paths is currently very limited, and a situation in which 
competing transcos will offer such alternative paths to neighboring 
transcos is unlikely.170 Availability of parallel paths will be virtually 
eliminated by the shift to large RTOs in which only those customers 
at the border of the region could switch to such a parallel path.171 
Few purchasers of electricity are sophisticated enough to take advan-
tage of these alternatives even if the alternatives were available; 
thus, parallel paths will remain a hidden reliability alternative. 
 In sum, transcos will have total market power within their re-
gions, and this market power will be enhanced as the generation and 
distribution/marketing segments become more competitive in supply-
ing transmission services.172 Purchasers of transmission services, ei-
ther generators or distributors/consumers, will compete with each 
other for transmission rights, and these purchasers will become more 
vulnerable to transco operations as a result. Purchasers, dependent 
on transcos for transmission services, will be unable to pursue 
strategies to counterbalance the transcos’ market power.173 
 The exploitation of this market power makes it unlikely that the 
transco model will enhance planning for future needs, which is the 
                                                                                                                      
 167. The theory’s developers warn, for example: “[W]here entry costs are present, the 
nonsustainability of natural monopoly means that a monopoly cannot find prices that per-
mit it to earn rent equal to the entry costs and prevent wasteful entry simultaneously. But 
that does not preclude the possibility that a natural monopoly can find prices that yield a 
slightly lower rent and leave it invulnerable to entry. In such a case, despite the unsus-
tainability, the threat of entry may still force the monopoly to behave better than it other-
wise would have.” BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 162, at 221. 
 168. See Joshua Rokach, Transcos: How FERC Can Lend a Hand, ELECTRICITY J., 
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 68. 
 169. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,424. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See Rokach, supra note 167, at 68. 
 172. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 173. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 50 (“Ordinarily, a highly concentrated buyer market 
reduces concerns about potential exercised of market power by sellers because buyers then 
have strategies available that render exercise of market power more difficult.”). 
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chief advantage touted by transco advocates.174 Commissioner Her-
bert, for example, asserted simply: “It is not clear that a non-profit 
ISO will be able to perform the functions required to build new 
transmission. In the end, if we [the for-profit sector] do not build it, 
the electrons will not come.”175 Herbert’s proposition is inconsistent 
with the traditional vision of monopolist behavior.176 Indeed, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s economists in a recent opposition to a pro-
posed transco asserted: “As a general proposition, a for-profit Transco 
may have incentives to perpetuate transmission congestion.”177 The 
creation of congestion can result in a lower supply of transmission 
capacity and higher profits for the transco.178 
 Accordingly, a transco can be expected to create scarcity in trans-
mission capacity, rather than to expand it. Monopolists manage to 
charge higher prices than firms in competitive industries by control-
ling the quantity of service or product supplied, rather than by sim-
ply raising prices.179 The transco model will not result in natural 
pressures to meet growing demand, but will result in monopolistic ef-
forts to take advantage of that growth by limiting transmission ca-
pacity in order to reap a greater profit. Perpetuation of this transco 
monopoly would, therefore, artificially create both higher prices and 
lower capacity, resulting in a net social welfare loss. 
 Similarly, the ISO model will not find inherent incentives for ex-
pansion of capacity, and special planning devices may be required to 
achieve this goal. The ISO model, however, does not have a similar 
profit incentive of the transco model to increase congestion and scar-
city of transmission capacity. Recognizing this dilemma, at least sub-
consciously, the transco advocates offer traditional regulatory solu-
tions such as capital investment incentives.180 Capital investment in-
centives are merely subsidies traditionally found in regulatory re-
gimes. This incentive rate approach is simply regression to old-
                                                                                                                      
 174. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22. 
 175. Id. at 21. 
 176. See sources cited at supra note 15 (discussing monopolies). 
 177. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, In the Matter of Energy Services, Inc. Doc. # EL 99-57-000 (May 27, 1999). 
 178. See id. 
 179. While a monopolist might be said to choose a price and hence accept a quantity, 
most consistent with actual behavior is the view that the monopolist controls the quantity 
in order to set the price. See HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 15, at 226. This be-
havior has been observed at least since Adam Smith’s first articulation of the free market 
theory. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 147-48 (Modern Library 1937). 
 180. Compare the view of the two FERC Commissioners: Herbert, supra note 153, at 
20 (“The case for incentive rates . . . is more compelling than ever.”); Massey, supra note 
89, at 13, 17 (“First, and fundamental to this debate, is the question of whether it is neces-
sary to dispense FERC candy to achieve our pro-competitive goals . . . [W]ill the candy 
treat we give out be so great that they overshadow or even eliminate the consumer benefits 
that could result from our grid regionalization policies?”) (emphasis added). 
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fashioned regulatory thinking,181 and is antithetical to creating a 
market-driven industry.182 
 The transco model will continue the old “regulatory compact” 
whereby it, like its predecessor IOUs, will be expected by government 
regulators to perform in the public interest in exchange for a domi-
nant market position. The impact of such a massive consolidation of 
market power in one for-profit entity is one of the many fears ex-
pressed by its opponents.183 Many transco critics fear that transcos, 
as former IOUs, will use their dominant market power and ability to 
create transmission congestion to benefit their “affiliates,” who are 
typically their former IOU partners operating the generation and 
distribution/marketing segments of the industry.184 The genesis of 
this concern is the FERC’s choice of “functional unbundling” rather 
than divestiture or “corporate unbundling.”185 As long as a continued 
corporate identity exists among the major entities in what should be 
truly competitive and distinct segments of the electricity market, dis-
crimination and under-the-table deals among affiliates will be diffi-
cult to prevent.186 Any adoption of the transco model must mandate a 
strict separation among the transco and other participants in the 
electricity market.187 
 The FERC would allow a deviation from strict corporate segrega-
tion of one percent, which means that market participants could own 
one percent of the transco, but potential transco owners can be ex-
pected to negotiate for higher allowable percentages of ownership.188 
For example, securities laws allow a tolerance of five percent owner-
ship before the SEC assumes control of the situation. Even a per-
centage of control as low as one percent raises potential problems, 
however, because it grants market participants’ access to the 
transco’s decisionmaking process.189 
                                                                                                                      
 181. The famous Averch-Johnson analysis suggests that regulators must accurately set 
rates at the true cost of capital or else regulated monopolies will overinvest. See Averch & 
Johnson, supra note 32. But see BREYER & MACAVOY, supra note 93, at 108 (positing that 
Averch-Johnson analysis “does not readily apply to electricity production.”). The Averch-
Johnson analysis seems unavoidable where regulators intentionally offer bonus rates for 
capital expenditures. 
 182. In the natural gas industry, incentives paved the way for new pipelines. See 
Robert Michaels & Arthur De Vany, Market-Based Rates for Interstate Pipelines: The Rele-
vant Market and the Real Market, 16 ENERGY L.J. 299 (1995). In the natural gas industry, 
the market precludes any seller from exercising market power. Several factors suggest that 
such a preclusion does not exist in the electric utility industry. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 
46. 
 183. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,552. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,415. 
 189. See id. 
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 Regardless, separation will be insufficient to offset the transco’s 
market power. Unfortunately, discrimination is just one way for a 
transco to exercise its market power. The idea that a firm can only 
exercise market power once is axiomatic.190 A firm may use its mar-
ket power to favor one part of its operation, say one in a competitive 
industry, or a firm can reap the benefits directly. However, a firm 
does not increase its market power by diffusing among its various 
units. Discrimination, however, may be used to avoid detection of the 
exercise of market power, and rate regulation may provide a strong 
incentive to engage in such practices.191 
 Ultimately, policy must focus on the market power conferred on 
transcos and not on how they might use it. The transcos will have 
substantial market power. Since market forces do not exist to temper 
transcos’ market power, regulation is the only alternative to the cur-
rent system. 
3.   The Transco Model Will Preclude Independence from Regulation 
 The transco model assumes continued regulation of the transmis-
sion segment.192 The restructured electric utility industry would fos-
ter competition in the generation and distribution/marketing seg-
ments, but transmission rates would still require regulation because 
each transco will be a regional monopoly.193 Arguably, the old part-
nership between utilities and regulators will be the best structure for 
the transmission segment since this regime’s performance has been 
at a minimum satisfactory to the majority of consumers.194 Still, the 
old regulatory regime offends the current desire for independence 
from government involvement in the industry. 
 Seeing their direct regulatory authority diminishing, regulators 
advocate an industry model necessarily committed to traditional 
regulation.195 Explaining regulators’ proposals through a public 
choice model would be facile. As Commissioner Bailey observed: “It’s 
hard for a regulator not to regulate.”196 Unsurprisingly, Commis-
                                                                                                                      
 190. See George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, in 
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152 (Philip B. Kurkland ed.); Alan Meese, Tying Meets the New Institu-
tional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1997). 
 191. See FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BUSINESS 
AND LABOR PRACTICES, 40-41 (1978). 
 192. See Vicky A. Bailey, Reassessing the Role of Regulators of Competitive Energy 
Markets, or: Walking the Walk of Competition, 20 ENERGY L.J. 1, 10 (1999) (After express-
ing indifference between the transco and ISO models, Commissioner Bailey observed: 
“Transco alternatives to not-for-profit ISOs should lack vertical integration and will con-
tinue to be regulated as public utilities by the FERC.”); see also Rokach, supra note 167, at 
65 (concurring with Bailey’s observation). 
 193. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 194. As observed by this Author. 
 195. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64. 
 196. Bailey, supra note 191, at 1. 
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sioner Bailey’s colleagues and their staff are drawn to the transco 
approach that necessarily continues a core of regulatory authority.197 
 Giving its proponents the benefit of the doubt, the transco model 
can honestly be seen as furthering a strong national commitment to 
private ownership and control.198 In addition, the transco model ap-
pears less risky because it perpetuates government control over this 
segment of the electric utility industry. Even though the transco will 
be privately owned and operated, the model nevertheless requires 
government regulation, which will disappoint advocates of pure de-
regulation. 
B.   ISO: Not-For-Profit Transmission Organizations 
 Until recently, a system built around various forms of grid man-
ager entities has dominated the transmission design debate. A spe-
cial type of ISO, known as independent system managers, has been 
proposed and adopted.199 In this scheme, the ISO directs and man-
ages transmission, but does not own or operate the facilities and is 
thus unaffected by commercial pressure. The FERC continues to pro-
vide that “the principle of independence is the bedrock upon which 
the ISO must be built.”200 The conditions for independence require a 
separation of ISO decision-makers and employees from market par-
ticipants.201 The advantage of the ISO model over the transco model 
is that the ISO has a direct duty to function for the benefit of all 
market participants and, ultimately, for the benefit of consumers.202 
Because the ISO is not driven by a profit motive, the ISO will not re-
quire regulation to prevent an abuse of its dominant market position. 
 Separating the grid manager from economic forces also has draw-
backs. The core drawback involves removal of the profit based incen-
tive structure. The system cannot depend on market forces to ensure 
that transmission wires deliver optimum service. Since ISOs will be 
insulated from the direct operation of market forces, they will require 
an entirely different set of incentives than the profit incentive driv-
ing transcos, as well as some form of direct monitoring by a regula-
tory entity.203 Thus, a design must be developed that will motivate 
                                                                                                                      
 197. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64. 
 198. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 20; Rokach, supra note 167, at 64. 
 199. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 71. 
 200. RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414 (quoting Atlantic City Elec. Co., et al., 77 
FERC ¶¶ 61,148, 61,574 (1996)). The FERC noted an agreement from the Department of 
Energy Reliability Task Force that concluded the transmission organization must be: 
“truly independent of commercial interests so that their reliability actions are—and are 
seen to be—unbiased and untainted.” Id. at 31,414 n.186. 
 201. See id. at 31,414. 
 202. See Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,596. 
 203. See Herbert, supra note 153, at 22 (“Through performance based regulation, 
FERC can provide incentives for maximum efficiency of operation . . . .”). 
598  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:569 
 
ISO managers, in the absence of market forces, to optimize the use of 
transmission facilities. 
 Designing such an incentive structure for ISO managers presents 
the greatest challenge to implementing the ISO model. Market in-
centives are overwhelmingly preferable to the alternatives, which 
have either failed or fallen short of expectations.204 Efficiency incen-
tives may be the plausible alternative to market incentives and may 
be the key to implementing a successful ISO.205 
 The choice between for-profit transcos and not-for-profit ISOs has 
hinged on which alternative offers the best opportunity for future re-
liability of the transmission system. The ISO model is preferable to 
the transco model because the for-profit transco can be expected to 
resist expansion of its transmission capacity in an attempt to in-
crease profitability,206 whereas the ISO will not resist expansion.207 
Since ISO managers are not self-interested and will not inhibit ex-
pansion of transmission capacity, the key is to prescribe incentives 
for ISO managers to promote future reliability.208 Designing incen-
tives that encourage ISO managers to engage in the proper level of 
expansion will be particularly challenging. 
 An additional complication is inherent in the ISO model’s depend-
ency on ISO managers to devise incentives for private, for-profit 
firms to invest in infrastructure and build for the future. ISOs are 
essentially management organizations and must implement reliabil-
ity plans by encouraging capital commitment, and unless an ISO has 
the tools to encourage future investment, capacity will be endan-
gered.209 In turn, if the ISO creates investment incentives allowing 
private transmission companies to profit from investment, the ISO 
must ensure that the investment incentives do not grant rights to the 
private transmission companies that encourage the bottleneck phe-
nomenon of decreasing transmission capacity to increase profits. 
Thus, the provision of profit incentives to private investors by ISOs 
could result in the same supply problems presented by the transco 
model. ISOs appear to ensure reliability, but devising proper incen-
tives that encourage investment remain problematic. 
                                                                                                                      
 204. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 50. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 207. See Pierce, supra note 101, at 51. 
 208. See id. at 52. 
 209. Potential solutions to this task have been developed. See William Hogan, Contract 
Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG. ECON. 211 (1992); James B. Bushnell 
& Steven E. Stoft, Electric Grid Investment Under a Contract Network Regime, 10 J. REG 
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gestions or some form of transmission congestion credit. 
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V.   GOVERNANCE OF THE TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION 
 Electricity is central to our modern society, and governance of the 
electric utilities’ core segment, the transmission organization, is cru-
cial to the effectiveness and public approval of a restructured indus-
try. Well-designed governance mechanisms will guard against the 
exploitation of transmission’s dominant position in the electric utility 
industry. However, governance mechanisms have more than a disci-
plinary role. Because electricity is so pervasive in modern society, 
public involvement in transmission operations is imperative for pub-
lic satisfaction with the restructured industry. Yet neither the fear of 
transmission’s dominant market position, nor the need for broad par-
ticipation can be allowed to encumber the transmission organiza-
tions’ ability to deliver adequate electric service. The design of gov-
ernance structures will require a careful balance between openness 
of process and necessary restraints on the one hand, and efficient 
management and operational freedom on the other. 
A.   Governance Mechanisms 
 Design of the governance mechanisms must reflect the fundamen-
tal role electricity plays in everyone’s life in the United States. In 
some way, individual interests must be represented in the transmis-
sion organization’s decisionmaking process, but individual interests 
cannot be represented in a homogeneous manner. Finding the proper 
vehicle for representing a wide spectrum of interests must be the 
overarching goal of governance design. Governance of the transmis-
sion organization will, of course, be affected by the choice between 
the transco and ISO models. The choice might involve both a practi-
cal and a normative judgment as to whether control, but not neces-
sarily ownership, of the transmission facilities should be vested in 
“shareholders” or “stakeholders.”210 
 A transco will primarily be a reconfiguration of the traditional In-
vestor Owned Utility (IOU), and control will remain in the hands of 
the shareholders, owners or investors.211 Managers in a transco will 
have a duty to maximize profits for the shareholders. In contrast, the 
ISO is an independent organization with a duty to all of its stake-
holders. The governing process of the ISO must reflect the large and 
diverse group that is affected by the ISO’s actions. Given the domi-
nant position of the transmission segment, a transco governance 
                                                                                                                      
 210. The FERC uses the term “stakeholder” interchangeably with “market partici-
pant,” to mean any entity that buys or sells electricity who might be affected by the RTO’s 
actions. See RTO NOPR, supra note 7, at 31,414 n.187. In this article, the term “stake-
holder” is used to include all those who have a stake in the proper operation of the electric 
utility industry, including ultimate consumers. 
 211. See supra Part III.A. 
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structure should likewise include more open and broad participation 
than the archetypical corporate governance structure. Yet, even with 
openness and participation, the transco model will require pervasive 
external monitoring.212 
 Whereas adoption of the transco model commits to the tradition of 
self-interested management and government oversight, the ISO 
model requires careful innovation in governance design. Because 
public interest decision-making is expected in the ISO model, con-
flicts of interest are a much greater concern.213 Self-interested deci-
sions will be expected and appropriately monitored in the transco 
model, but the ISO will be expected to act for the greater good of the 
entire system and, due to the lack of monitoring, will present many 
more opportunities for clandestine self-dealing.214 
 Division of power is the dominant strategy for dealing with con-
flicts of interests and abuses by managers. For example, the PJM re-
gional transmission organization has a “board of managers” that 
governs two component sections: a “members committee” and the 
“Office of the Interconnection.”215 In a similar commitment to divided 
power, the FERC envisions a governing board of “non-stakeholders,” 
which the FERC terms “non-market participants.”216 The FERC pro-
vides that “[t]he non-stakeholder board would be the ultimate deci-
sion making authority, though it could choose to delegate decisions to 
its staff or committees of stakeholders.”217 By dividing power and 
forcing transparency of decisionmaking, self-interested decisions 
should be extremely difficult. 
 Expressing concern that the non-stakeholder board fails to grasp 
the practical problems faced by market participants, the FERC re-
quested comments on whether stakeholders should be represented on 
that governing board. 218 The FERC’s non-stakeholder category does 
not encompass the diversity of interests that must be addressed in 
any electric utility governance structure.219 No other industry has 
such a broad array of discrete interests as does the electric utility in-
dustry, which includes market participants, non-market partici-
pants, and various government institutions. Each of these groups is 
comprised of subgroups with distinct interests and goals.220 These 
                                                                                                                      
 212. See Massey, supra note 89, at 16. 
 213. See Michaels, supra note 69, at 234. 
 214. See id. 
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subgroups are only facially united by the overarching goal of having 
the industry function efficiently.  
 Thus, one readily apparent design defect is the forced compilation 
of too many groups into one governing body. The ISO design should 
examine European government operations that often include exter-
nal committees with real power. The European Union’s (EU’s) or-
ganic laws establish, for example, two representative committees, a 
committee representing “various categories of economic and social ac-
tivity,” and a committee representing “regional and local bodies.”221 
These committees “must be consulted” by the government institu-
tions,222 and although the law only requires consultation, these com-
mittees do have practical power. The EU’s governing bodies also 
delegate “legislative”223 authority to “management committees.”224 
Some of these committees are consultative only, but some are “regu-
latory committees,” who have real formal power. Any measure issued 
by these governing bodies cannot take effect until it receives a favor-
able opinion from the management committees. 
 Instead of attempting to provide representation for these numer-
ous groups of diverse interests on one or two governing boards, ISO 
governance should formally disperse power among committees con-
sisting of various categories of interests.225 A consumer committee, 
for example, will present a united consumer perspective226 that any 
governing body must consider. Certain specialized committees could 
have special powers of approval for decisions involving the commit-
tees’ areas of expertise. A pure delegation of authority and power to 
specialized committees might be dangerous, while an open process of 
consultation with specialized committees could provide effective rep-
resentation of all stakeholders.227 
 Still, one governing body must have final decisionmaking author-
ity, and a broad representation of interests on that body is crucial. 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) alleviated a similar represen-
tation problem by creating a board of directors consisting of equal 
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numbers of public and industry directors. The NYSE ‘s constitution 
designates which groups the public directors should represent.228 A 
similar structure may be effective in the electric utility industry. A 
separate nominating committee that generally reflects the represen-
tation on the board nominates the NYSE board members. This sepa-
rate nominating committee, while not totally insulating the process 
from manipulation, at least opens the process to public scrutiny. 
B.   Regulatory Aspects of Transmission Organizations 
 The Department of Justice aptly characterized the ISO as a self-
regulatory organization (SRO) that is comparable to a stock ex-
change.229 The extensive experience of the securities industry SROs, 
particularly the NYSE and the National Association of Stock Dealers 
(NASD), should provide some insight into private regulatory opera-
tions. The SRO regulatory strategy is to allow the industry to police 
itself. The government agency’s role is to monitor the SRO.230 The 
SROs have the advantage of understanding the industry and balanc-
ing effective regulation with its practical needs. The SROs’ commit-
ment to effective regulation is ensured by the threat that governmen-
tal entities will resume regulation if the SROs’ performance proves 
inadequate. The ISO model will allow the electric utility industry to 
employ the SRO strategy. The ISO would establish policies, set stan-
dards, conduct compliance operations, and provide enforcement dis-
pute resolution processes.231 The FERC would monitor the ISOs to 
ensure that they fairly and effectively perform their regulatory re-
sponsibilities.232 
 In contrast, the transco choice requires direct regulation because 
its governing body will have a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to 
maximize its profit.233 That duty constrains the transco manager’s 
power to make public interest motivated decisions. Thus to ensure 
social welfare, regulators must be directly involved in overseeing 
transco management decisions rather than assuming a monitoring 
role as prescribed under the ISO model.234 Still, the transco might be 
designed to be more sensitive to interests other than those of its 
shareholders. An alternative, for example, might be to delegate spe-
cial legislative authority with the directive to include certain public 
interest considerations in transco decisionmaking. While the transco 
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manager’s business judgment might undervalue public interest con-
siderations, transcos will be forced to justify choices on public inter-
est grounds and will be criticized for choices inimical to that inter-
est.235 To enforce this policy, legislation might even allow some type 
of formal utlra vires challenge to specifically designated transco 
management decisions. 
C.   Process for Policy-Making in Transmission Organizations 
 In addition to the independence of the ultimate decisionmaking 
authority, the process of formulating transmission organization pol-
icy and setting standards must be open and must facilitate participa-
tion by interested parties. As with government agencies, transmis-
sion organizations will exercise quasi-legislative authority through 
its promulgation of rules.236 Federal and state agencies are required 
to use “notice and comment” procedures to promulgate rules with 
binding effect.237 The rulemaking process has four general require-
ments: notice, an opportunity for comments, a statement justifying 
the rule, and publication.238 The notice and comment procedures cre-
ate an extremely effective method for openness, participation, and in-
formation gathering.239 
 However, the shift to a non-governmental entity, such as an ISO, 
may cause abandonment of the standard procedure for governmental 
rulemaking. The NYSE’s constitution delegates rulemaking author-
ity to its board, but does not mandate a participatory process.240 Ex-
isting ISOs also do not require such procedures.241 The FERC’s own 
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rules should require public access to the rulemaking processes of 
transmission organizations. The FERC should employ its own ex-
perience with notice and comment requirements to provide guidance 
to transmission organizations on developing open processes. 
 The key to the fairness and effectiveness of informal rulemaking 
is the adequacy of notice. The electric utility industry has established 
a sophisticated electronic network system that could be used to pro-
vide effective electronic notice. The Open Access Same-time Informa-
tion System (OASIS) will provide interested parties with real notice, 
as opposed to the publication of notice in the federal register.242 Using 
only electronic notice, however, may be insufficient because the gen-
eral public will not be monitoring systems such as OASIS. 
 Electronic technology may also enhance participation in the com-
ment process. One study shows that agencies that offer the opportu-
nity to comment in electronic form receive far greater numbers of 
comments.243 Moreover, a process whereby comments are submitted 
in electronic form enables use of computerized organization and 
search capabilities. Electronic capacity and storage, therefore, will 
mitigate one of the most difficult problems in rulemaking: the man-
agement of a lengthy and complex record.244 
 Transmission organizations should also employ negotiated rule-
making as it is applied in federal administrative law. Negotiated 
rulemaking facilitates the development of rules by interested par-
ties.245 Ultimately, the negotiated rule will still be presented for pub-
lic comment so that those excluded from the negotiation will have an 
opportunity to contribute.246 ISOs, even more than government agen-
cies, should use negotiation to effectively incorporate all the key in-
terests in setting policy and standards with a minimum of formal 
procedures. 
 Negotiated rulemaking is an established element in federal ad-
ministrative law.247 When interested people are brought together and 
develop a rule, the process is more efficient, effective, and sensitive to 
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all interests. Many commentators have promoted negotiated rule-
making as a cure for many of the problems with government rule-
making.248 Though initially viewed merely as an experiment to pro-
mote negotiated rulemaking, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 
1990249 has encouraged use of the process by many federal agencies. 
The experience of these agencies with negotiated rulemaking may 
assist in the development of such processes by transmission organi-
zations.250 
 Many theoretical and practical problems with negotiated rules ex-
ist such as which parties to include in the negotiations. This and 
other problems raise general questions about negotiated rulemak-
ing,251 but by anticipating these possible pitfalls, they can be avoided 
while developing a negotiation process for transmission organiza-
tions. The nature of the transmission organization itself will greatly 
affect the process. It will not so much participate as a party, as a 
government agency does in negotiated rulemaking, but more as a 
mediator attempting to work out an agreement among the stake-
holders. Thus, negotiation processes should be one of the alternative 
procedures available in transmission organization policymaking and 
standard setting. 
 Government regulators will monitor policymaking by transmis-
sion organizations, as they do with other SROs, but courts must also 
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have a role. Appropriately defined judicial review will contribute to 
the policy dialogue and add political legitimacy to the decisions of the 
transmission organization.252 Such legitimacy is imperative for an in-
dustry that affects every citizen. The key is to carefully define a judi-
cial role in transmission organization policymaking that takes ad-
vantage of its monitoring and legitimizing functions while still ena-
bling the process to benefit from the expertise and efficiencies of 
transmission organization governance.253 Accordingly, the judicial 
presence should be well defined and minimal.254 Unless experience 
dictates otherwise, judicial review should be confined to decisions 
made by government monitors of transmission organization policy-
making. 
VI.   INDIVIDUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 The market approach to the electric utility industry will raise a 
variety of individual disputes that were not problematic under the 
private management and regulatory regime. Because the industry 
was vertically integrated, most decisions were handled as part of in-
ternal management. As the industry becomes more functionally and 
structurally unbundled, categories of these management decisions 
become private disputes. Private, governmental, or judicial dispute 
resolution, therefore, will become a key factor in both the cost-
effectiveness and the appearance of fairness of the restructured in-
dustry. The FERC should take a leadership role in the formulation 
and implementation of dispute resolution procedures for transmis-
sion organizations and the industry. 
A.   The Need for Individual Dispute Resolution 
 Since these disputes are private, they might be resolved within 
the ordinary judicial process; however, the creation of a massive new 
body of litigation could be avoided through implementation of alter-
native dispute resolution processes (ADR). In Order 888’s eleven 
principles, the FERC recommends including ADR procedures in all 
transmission organization design.255 The appropriateness of ADR in a 
transmission organization is affected by the choice between for-profit 
and not-for-profit entities. The transcos will be active participants 
with a clear interest in the resolution of many disputes, and the 
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transcos will often be one of the parties in the disputes. Thus, avoid-
ing conflicts of interest militates against transcos managing the dis-
pute resolution process. ISOs, on the other hand, are by definition 
independent third parties and could appropriately operate a dispute 
resolution process for the benefit of the market participants. Alleged 
misconduct by the ISO itself will in any event be presented to regula-
tory authorities or to the judiciary. 
 Government regulatory authorities could also provide the ADR 
process as an alternative or supplement to private processes. As the 
system moves inexorably towards regional transmission organiza-
tions, the FERC becomes the only feasible government institution to 
provide ADR services. A FERC administered ADR service would be 
particularly appropriate for transcos. The legitimacy of the FERC 
providing the mechanism for resolving private disputes arising di-
rectly from electricity transmission is unquestionable. In Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,256 the U.S. Supreme Court 
even allowed the agency’s dispute resolution service to resolve “a 
narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the [agency’s] 
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function.”257 Nonetheless, 
the FERC’s observation is accurate that “[i]t is generally more effi-
cient for these organizations to resolve many disputes internally 
rather than bringing every dispute to the Commission.”258 
 The transmission organization could rely on existing arbitration 
and mediation mechanisms.259 Existing ISO arrangements incorpo-
rate arbitration and mediation devices.260 Arbitration can be success-
ful for the transco, as well as for the ISO model. Contracts made be-
tween either variety of transmission organization and other market 
participants should require that disputes be taken to an independent 
dispute resolution authority. Thus, ADR will be appropriate even 
when the transco itself is a party to the dispute. Compulsory arbitra-
tion has been consistently upheld.261 The Supreme Court in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,262 held that an individual employee 
who had signed an arbitration agreement as part of his application 
for registration with the NYSE was bound to arbitrate.263 The Court 
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rejected the argument that arbitration is procedurally and substan-
tively inadequate.264 
 The FERC, nonetheless, should adhere to its original principle 
that “[a]n ISO should establish an ADR process to resolve disputes in 
the first instance.”265 Existing ISOs or their equivalent have estab-
lished their own dispute resolution processes. For example, the by-
laws of the California ISO require that “to the extent practicable, 
reasonable and permitted by law,” dispute resolution procedures 
should be included in each contract.266 The PJM regional transmis-
sion organization has a fairly elaborate process and has established 
an Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee to deal with con-
flicts.267 
 Procedures for electric utility ADR should be uniquely designed to 
handle disputes replete with a wide range of expert opinions regard-
ing engineering, finance, and industry specific practices.268 ADR in 
the United States, unlike AFR in other countries, employs generalist 
judges and a single procedural form. However, disputes in the elec-
tric utility industry will require specialist decisionmakers and tai-
lored processes.269 The rejection of regulation does not mean that one 
should ignore the consistent finding of administrative law that tradi-
tional judicial practice must be modified under many administrative 
conditions. 
B.   FERC’s Contribution to Transmission Organization ADR 
1.   FERC Must Assure Procedural Adequacy 
 The best dispute resolution option is probably the one provided by 
an independent transmission organization. Still, the FERC has ulti-
mate responsibility for ensuring that the procedures will be ade-
quate.270 Courts are not inclined to second-guess private procedural 
design, but the FERC’s scrutiny should be thorough. 
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 Procedural due process might apply to transmission organization 
adjudications. First, these adjudications are so intertwined with gov-
ernment authorization that they may constitute “state action.”271 
Since Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,272 a SRO’s procedures have 
been subject to review, if not under due process, then under some 
fundamental notion of fairness.273 But procedural due process has 
long been understood as a flexible concept amendable to practical 
considerations.274 
 Because reasonable ADR designs will be accepted when justified 
by the circumstances, the FERC should actively participate in devel-
oping procedural ADR designs. The experience from both due process 
jurisprudence and administrative law is vast and should be carefully 
examined in developing designs tailored to the various adjudicative 
tasks arising from the restructured electric utility industry. More-
over, actual experience with such dispute resolution is growing 
within the industry and is well developed in other SRO contexts. 
 The RTO NOPR seeks comment on the types of issues that would 
be appropriate for ISO dispute resolution.275 The FERC should follow 
this line of inquiry further, take steps to develop categories of dis-
putes that will arise in the restructured electric utility industry, and 
encourage uniform procedures tailored to each category. For exam-
ple, electricity operations will generate disputes about the failure to 
perform, compensation for coverage of such failures by the transmis-
sion organization, unfair practices, disciplinary actions against cer-
tain market participants, claims of violation of open access princi-
ples, and implementation of curtailment priorities. Each of these is-
sues should generate carefully crafted procedures for uniform use in 
all the transmission regions. The FERC should add its own special-
ized experience in electricity adjudications to the formation of proce-
dural ADR designs. 
 The FERC should lead the search for innovative procedural ADR 
approaches. Many of the disputes will demand very expeditious and 
cost-conscious processes. The FERC and its practitioners have con-
siderable experience with written hearings and, especially in dis-
putes involving expert considerations, the FERC should apply its ex-
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perience to procedural ADR design.276 Off-site technology should also 
be examined since the growing comfort with technology has led to the 
acceptance of telephone hearings or interactive video hearings. In the 
busy world of the restructured electric utility industry, such alterna-
tives to face-to-face confrontation may be preferable to the parties in-
volved in disputes. 
2.   FERC Should Promote a Specialized Presiding Official Pool 
 The FERC should facilitate the development of a national pool of 
electricity adjudicators. Judge Friendly, in his seminal work on ad-
ministrative procedures, observed that an impartial decisionmaker is 
the most essential element to fair adjudications.277 The FERC should 
focus on ensuring the availability of competent, impartial, and expert 
adjudicators. 
 Central panels comprised of administrative presiding officials 
have been created in nearly half of the states.278 The central panel is 
administrated by an independent agency that provides presiding offi-
cials to agencies. The presiding officials have the advantage of inde-
pendence from the agencies and thereby create both the appearance 
and the reality of impartiality. This independence from the parties, 
even from the agency, also allows for the management of presiding 
officials without compromising their impartiality. 
 The FERC should also facilitate the establishment of an inde-
pendent national panel of judges, specializing in electricity issues, to 
whom transmission organizations may request hearing of their dis-
putes. As with states’ central panels of administrative officials, this 
pool of specialized ‘electricity’ judges will be independent of the 
transmission organizations and market participants. Indeed, if the 
transco model is adopted, this appearance of independence will be 
crucial. At present, the default approach seems to be reliance on a 
general pool of arbitrators who lack specialized knowledge of the 
electric utility industry. While the default approach might ensure in-
dependence, it cannot ensure the type of expertise necessary to adju-
dicate many of the disputes that will develop in the restructured 
electric utility industry. A panel of judges specializing in electricity 
issues could ensure expertise by imposing qualifying standards and 
continuing education. 
 This national panel of judges should be independent of the FERC. 
While the FERC should take the necessary steps to establish an elec-
tricity panel, the FERC should then allow the panel to operate as an 
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independent private organization. The federal government could 
fund and establish standards for the panel. Alternatively, the panel 
could also easily be funded from fees assessed to the transmission or-
ganizations, and a panel governing board could establish its own 
management and performance standards. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. McClure279 found that a 
government-sponsored system employing private adjudicators did 
not violate due process.280 In this case involving reimbursement un-
der Medicare,281 the claimant charged that presiding officials were 
not impartial because the insurance companies had hired them.282 In 
the absence of direct evidence showing partiality, the Court refused 
to infer bias from the fact that private judges were technically em-
ployees of the insurance companies.283 Further, the Court rejected the 
argument that government adjudication was necessary for due proc-
ess.284 Thus, a panel of electricity judges would be a legitimate solu-
tion to the need for independent, expert presiding officials.285 
C.   Review of Law and Policy in an Electricity 
Dispute Resolution System 
 The independence of dispute resolutions, whether by private arbi-
tration or special panels, might threaten presiding officers’ faithful-
ness to both the law and transmission organization policy in individ-
ual application. Some review of individual decisions, therefore, must 
be available. A key to successful performance of the dispute resolu-
tion process within the larger system will depend on a clear articula-
tion of review responsibilities. Three review authorities will operate 
in the system: transmission organization governing body review, 
government agency review, and judicial review. 
1.   Administrative Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions 
 As discussed above, the transmission organizations will generate 
a body of policy decisions and standards. The independent operation 
of a dispute resolution process may threaten the uniform application 
                                                                                                                      
 279. 456 U.S. 188 (1982). 
 280. See id. at 200; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
571 (1985) (concluding that Article III of the Constitution does not prohibit “[c]ongress 
from selecting binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for 
resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA’s [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act] pesticide registration scheme”). 
 281. See 456 U.S. at 189-90. 
 282. See id. at 192-93. 
 283. See id. at 195. 
 284. See id. at 198. 
 285. Delegation of adjudicatory authority to a private entity is constitutional. See Kin-
kopf, supra note 234, at 396. 
612  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:569 
 
of these policies.286 In addition, disappointed parties in the dispute 
resolution process will want a second review. 
 Existing transmission organizations’ arrangements call for admin-
istrative review by the FERC or relevant state authorities.287 Appeal 
to these government authorities can certainly ensure adherence to 
tariffs and other agreements between the transmission organizations 
and the government authorities. The government authorities could 
also develop administrative review processes that would check un-
fairness or discrimination. 
 However, the transmission organization itself might provide such 
review.288 The transmission organization can best determine faithful 
adherence to its policies and standards. Moreover, internal self-
correction will further eliminate the need for government involve-
ment in the transmission process. As the experience in government 
agencies indicates, dealing with individual cases will sharpen the 
governing authorities’ policymaking and standard setting. 
2.   Judicial Review of Individual Dispute Resolutions 
 The court’s role in electricity dispute resolutions must be carefully 
circumscribed. The judicial process will often be inappropriate for the 
resolution of these disputes. Yet judicial involvement cannot be to-
tally precluded; the courts must ensure compliance with the laws. 
Currently, the law accommodates a limited judicial role in dispute 
resolutions. Judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions is limited to en-
suring that those decisions comport with the law and documents au-
thorizing the arbitration.289 Generally, courts do not review the mer-
its of an arbitration award.290 
 The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products Co.291 determined that in establishing an arbitration proc-
ess administered by a federal agency, Congress could severely limit 
judicial review.292 Judicial review was available in that program only 
for “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.”293 The Court con-
cluded that the arbitration scheme did not contravene Article III of 
the Constitution.294 Even though manufacturers’ claims under the 
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act had some aspects 
of “private rights” for which judicial protection is required, the Court 
concluded that these issues were not “purely” private rights and 
hence Congress could provide for arbitration.295 Likewise, the issues 
in electricity dispute resolution will not be purely private rights and, 
hence, limits on judicial review should be found acceptable. 
 Thus, judicial review can be limited in any transmission organiza-
tion dispute resolution regime either by agreement or delegation. The 
key is properly defining those limits. In general, judicial review 
should be limited to questions of law and assertion of jurisdiction by 
the transmission organization’s ADR authority. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Design of the electricity transmission organization is, in fact, the 
keystone of the restructuring process. Failure here will handicap the 
restructured industry for the foreseeable future. Great care is called 
for in acceptance of proposed designs, in the regulation now before 
the FERC, and future legislative actions. 
 Hard choices will be made. Surely, the transmission organizations 
must be regional, and the FERC should mandate that option. The 
trend towards independent not-for-profit operators, the ISO model, 
should be continued. The for-profit, transco model, raises a real spec-
ter of unbridled market power, which, at best, will mean the per-
petuation of the regulatory regime. Regardless of the outcome of 
these two basic choices, particular care must be taken in designing 
the internal policymaking, standard setting, and dispute resolution 
processes. Participants in that design, many of whom are not accus-
tomed to confronting such issues, must ensure that the internal deci-
sionmaking process fits the special needs of this restructured indus-
try. 
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